Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have already driven millions of miles on public roads, but even the simplest scenarios have not been certified for safety. Current methodologies for the verification of AV's decision and control systems attempt to divorce the lower level, short-term trajectory planning and trajectory tracking functions from the behavioral rules-based framework that governs mid-term actions. Such analysis is typically predicated on the discretization of the state space and has several limitations. First, it requires that a conservative buffer be added around obstacles such that many feasible plans are classified as unsafe. Second, the discretized controllers modeled in this analysis require several refinement steps before being implementable on an actual AV, and typically do not allow the specification of comfort-related properties on the trajectories. In contrast, consumer-ready AVs use motion planning algorithms that generate smooth trajectories. While viable algorithms exist for the generation of smooth trajectories originating from a single state, analysis should consider that the AV faces state estimation errors and disturbances. Third, verification is restricted to a discretized state space with fixed-size cells; this assumption can artificially limit the set of available trajectories if the discretization is too coarse. Conversely, too fine of a discretization renders the problem intractable for automated analysis. This work presents a new verification tool, APEX, which investigates the combined action of a behavioral planner and state lattice-based motion planner to guarantee a safe vehicle trajectory is chosen. In APEX, decisions made at the behavioral layer can be traced through to the spatio-temporal evolution of the AV and verified. Thus, there is no need to create abstractions of the AV's controllers, and aggressive trajectories required for evasive maneuvers can be accurately investigated. 
Introduction
Active Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and fully autonomous vehicles (AVs) feature a complex integration between discrete and continuous controllers. The discrete controllers make decisions regarding the vehicle's next goal ("move to left lane"), while the continuous controllers determine throttle and steering inputs which allow the vehicle to execute the decisions of the discrete controller. As such vehicles come to market there is a pressing need to bound and minimize the risks they might pose to other vehicles, pedestrians and infrastructure.
Legal liability is a main consideration in the design of these vehicles, and could determine the future of ADAS and AVs as a mainstream technology. The question is: who's liable when the AV (or an ADAS feature) causes an accident or unsafe situation? Currently there is no one answer to the question: on the ADAS side, Tesla Motors will be rolling out an automated car passing feature, but which is initiated by the human driver as a way to make the latter ultimately responsible for the outcomes. Volvo on the other hand has recently announced it will assume full liability for its autonomous cars' actions, and warns that "the US risks losing its leading position due to the lack of Federal guidelines for the testing and certification of autonomous vehicles" [1] . The possibility that the manufacturer might ultimately be deemed responsible for the car's actions highlights the urgent need for a technology that can automatically and exhaustively certify the impossibility of accidents in various driving scenarios, and under well-defined conditions.
It is clear that, next generation AVs will remain research projects because if there is a lack of confidence that they can be used in safety critical applications. More specifically, there are currently few practical tools for plan verification and execution analysis [6] . New, more practical methods, for formal verification and model based design could increase the confidence that highly autonomous systems can be put into service and can potentially reduce both development costs and time to market.
There are a large variety of scenarios in which the AVs will operate: for example, highway driving, entrance ramps, roundabouts, and stoplights. Furthermore, each scenario has a large number of variations: highway driving for example involves a varying number of cars and different starting configurations of the cars. These configurations determine how close to each other the cars are starting, their initial speeds, orientations, and their goals. The configuration space can be extremely large, and in fact, is often uncountably infinite, as can be seen by considering that a car's position, is a real-valued variable. In this paper, we address two questions: (1) Is it possible to investigate all configurations via symbolic abstraction? (2) If it is, how can we verify that the car's behavior is correct in all configurations? Here, correct means that the vehicle is safe, and achieves the mobility goals of the pilot.
The most common approach today to verifying the safety and correctness of the car's controllers is to run a very large number of simulations. Every simulation varies the scenario configuration: in one simulation the cars start 0.7m away from each other, in another they start 2m apart with equal speeds, in yet a third they start 2m apart with the lead vehicle making a left turn. However, simulation always leaves a verification gap. To illustrate this gap, let's focus on one scenario: lane change.
Simulating a lane change
Consider the situations presented in Fig. 1 , all of which are variations on a lane change scenario. Every car in the scenario is characterized by its state x which includes at least its position, velocity, orientation and yaw rate. In general, additional variables might be used to describe the state of the car at every time instant. In our experiment, for example, we use a 7-dimensional state. To simulate this scenario, we need to choose initial values for these variables, i.e., an initial state x(0) (which we called configuration above). Note that once an initial state is fixed, the system evolves deterministically based on the controllers of each car. This initial state can have any value in a bounded set: e.g., in our example (see Fig. 1 ), the initial position (s x , s y ) of the ego vehicle is in [0, 1] × [0, 1], and the velocity v is in [24, 33]m/s. There are two distinct sources for this uncertainty about the state: first, the ego vehicle will have to perform a lane change under a variety of conditions, equivalently, under a variety of initial states. Simulating it under only one initial state is clearly insufficient, because we expect the outcome of the scenario when the two cars start 0.5m apart to differ from its outcome when the two cars start 5m apart. The second source of uncertainty comes from errors in perception such as self-localization and velocity estimates, even if we wish to start the simulation in a particular state, inaccuracies in measurements mean that the car's state can not be exactly known. So while the control algorithms assume a given starting state, the car may be actually begin from anywhere in a bounded set around that state estimate. Thus it's important to verify that these measurement errors do not cause unsafe situations.
The question then becomes: how many simulations should we perform, and which simulations should we perform? Ideally, we would simulate all configurations that produce an unsafe outcome, but this can not be guaranteed in general. Even experienced engineers might not think of corner cases, especially given the size of the vehicles configuration space. E.g., in Fig. 1 , we show a lane change scenario, which has been simu- Figure 1 : Simulation is not sufficient to fully verify a lane change. After a large number of simulations, the unsafe scenario at the bottom may still not be detected as simulation-based testing is not exhaustive and leaves a verification gap. lated a 1000 times, including with varying numbers of vehicles. Yet, it is only the last, non-simulated, situation that reveals the collision: if the ego vehicle starts with a positive orientation and yaw rate, and attempts to change lanes while the other vehicle is slowing down, it could cause a collision. This is because the ego vehicle is unable to exactly follow the reference trajectory which the motion planner determined would be safe.
Randomized testing, where the configurations are sampled from hypercubes of parameters, is not a scalable solution: suppose we decide to sample only 10 points in the range of every state variable. For our 7D model, and with 2 cars, this yields a total of 10 14 simulations. Say we wish to simulate 10 seconds. Even if a simulation runs in real-time, this still requires 10 * 10 14 seconds = 30 million years to complete.
Thus, while simulations are a useful and intuitive method for getting a quick confidence level in the basic safety of a scenario, they are not sufficient for guaranteeing the absence of risk in a given scenario with a bounded state space.
Contributions
Our main contribution is an approach to formally verifying the trajectory planning and trajectory tracking stacks of an ADAS/AV. This approach is implemented in a software tool, APEX, and illustrated with examples of a lane change maneuver. The verification approach has two characteristics:
• It is formal: we are guaranteed that if APEX determines a scenario to be safe, then it is safe. No amount of simulation can find an unsafe behavior in a scenario verified as correct by APEX.
• It allows the use of an arbitrary trajectory planner, including one that only exists as code. That is, there is no need to model the trajectory planner, which is often very complex software. Moreover, the same trajectory planner can then be run on a real vehicle. APEX uses a trajectory planner that has been tested on a real vehicle.
In APEX, the verification engineer can • Specify the low-level dynamics of the vehicle, including the trajectory tracker. These can be nonlinear. The default model in APEX is a 7D bicycle model. The three layer architecture presented by Gat is widely accepted as a standard means of implementing planning and control for an autonomous vehicle.
• Provide a motion planner that takes in a starting position and end position and returns a trajectory that links the two points. The motion planner can be any piece of software: there are no restrictions on it. The default planner in APEX is a state lattice planner incorporated in ROS and tested on a real vehicle.
• Specify a sequence of goal positions (or waypoints) that the vehicle must visit, or a behavioral planner that computes these waypoints in a reactive manner. The default behavioral planner in APEX is a simple 2-state automaton that decides whether to do lane following or lane changing.
• Specify the uncertainty sets for the ego vehicle and the other agents in the scenario.
• Specify the unsafe conditions to be avoided by the vehicle. APEX supports a rich specification language (namely, Linear Temporal Logic) for describing unsafe behaviors.
APEX will then verify, in an exhaustive fashion, that the ego vehicle can complete the scenario under the specified uncertainty, or return a specific case where it fails. The engineers can then use this counter-example in order to debug the controllers, and better understand how to avoid this failure. APEX is to be used at design-time by the verification engineers. It will allow them to quickly make modifications to the car's controllers, and exhaustively verify the scenarios of interest.
APEX description and usage

Planning and Control for Autonomous Vehicles
In order to motivate the need for the APEX approach, we first outline the architecture of a typical ADAS/AV control. It is not necessary that a vehicle use such an architecture in order to be verified under APEX, but it motivates the key issues involved in obtaining a proof of safety. In the three-layer architecture paradigm [5] the planning and control of the vehicle is hierarchical in nature. Each successive layer performs a task over a shorter horizon. Fig. 2 details this approach to AV architecture.
At the top level a mission planner is given a mobility goal. Such a goal is typically expressed as a location, destination pair.
Given this pair the mission planner finds an optimal (or feasible) route through the road network. Such planning can be implemented using Djikstra's shortest paths algorithm, A*, or similar approaches. It is not particularly relevant in terms of the safety verification of the vehicle.
The next lower layer, the behavioral planner, makes local decisions about how to navigate the road network. For example, if the mission planner informs the behavioral planner that at the next intersection it will need to turn left in order to drive on the next road link in the mission plan, the behavior planner will use a set of rules to determine that the ego vehicle must be in the left lane and adjust the goals of local planner accordingly.
Finally, the local planner, or trajectory planner, converts the largely symbolic results of the mission planner and behavioral planner into trajectories implementable by the steering and acceleration actuators on the vehicle. Given a goal relative to the vehicle's current pose, the local planner computes a set of trajectories represented as parallelized cubic splines. The local planner then choses a single trajectory and sends it to the vehicle plant. The vehicle itself includes a PID controller (or some other controller) which tracks desired steering angles and requested velocity.
Formal Verification
Formal verification broadly defines a class of algorithms or methods which can provide a certificate or proof that a system satisfies a particular specification. It establishes the absence of bugs. Fig. 3 describes the input and output of a formal verification algorithm. In particular the system designer must provide the requirements on the system behavior, the assumptions on the environment behavior, and a system design in a compatible formalism. Together these components make up the formal specification and system model. These two components are then composed together and verified; the output of the verification process is either a proof that the system satisfies the specification or a counterexample detailing how the system can fail.
Reachability
APEX is primarily concerned with formal verification of hybrid systems. In general hybrid systems provide a precise and formal means of describing models which have both continuous state variables and discrete state variables (like operating modes). Formal verification of hybrid systems is extremely difficult, and there are numerous proofs even simple classes can not be for- Figure 3 : Formal methods are the only proven and reliable way to show the absence of errors in a system, verification can either provide a certificate that the system satisfies the specification or a counterexample which details a specific violation Figure 4 : Reachability Analysis is a means of formal verification which shows that for a given initial set and a specified unsafe set, no trajectory of the system can reach the unsafe set mally verified [3] -so-called undecidable classes of systems. In this work we utilize a special form of bounded reachability analysis which is decidable even for non-linear hybrid systems. Reachability asks the following question: given an initial set of states is it ever possible for a trajectory of the system to reach an unsafe set of states? In the context of APEX, we ask: given some initial uncertainty about the state of the vehicle and minimal constraints on the configuration of the environment, is it ever possible for the ego vehicle to violate traffic laws or not achieve its goal? Fig. 4 details a simple reachability problem which APEX could return a formal proof about. For each trajectory generated by the planner, APEX calls dReach [4] , a reachability analysis tool for nonlinear hybrid systems.
The APEX Approach
The APEX approach to formal verification of AVs and ADAS systems seeks to follow plan executions through to the vehicle's actual motion in the environment. We emphasize that the verification process is offline -the vehicle does not run APEX while it is driving. Fig. 6 highlights a single execution of the verification engine. Note that, at each decision by the behavioral planner there may be multiple executions of the verification engine depending on the design of the behavioral planner. Fig. 5 describes how the execution of the controller online relates to the offline verification process. In sharp contrast to the simulation based approach outlined in the introduction, the result of the APEX approach is that we have converted a hopeless brute force search over real intervals into a finite series of tractable bounded reachability problems over a verification horizon.
Tool Input
APEX is a command line tool for verification of autonomous vehicle missions written in Python and C++. The input to the verification process is a mission definition file which is written in Python so that it is simpler to edit. The mission definition script defines the sequence of waypoints or road links which the vehicle will traverse in order to achieve a mobility goal.
The mission defintion file describes the following:
• The collection of agents in the scenario, consisting of the ego vehicle and other cars in the scenario. The agents are described via ODEs that describe the evolution of their Figure 6 : One step in the APEX tool: the local planner generates a trajectory, which is automatically input into the mission description file and verified using dReach state with time, and their behavioral planners, which give the next waypoints for each vehicle. All agents operate in an ontology specific to the mission, in this case the world model consists of a geometric description of a road network.
• Set of initial states for each state variable of every vehicle.
• The constraints on the cars' behavior, such as traffic laws and the unsafe conditions that ego vehicle must avoid. These are described in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL).
• The goal of the ego vehicle, also expressed in LTL.
The mission definition file is part of a mission definition script. The latter manages the execution of the behavioral planner and trajectory generator. Each (state, goal) pair that is encountered on the mission generates at least one trajectory which must be verified. The mission definition script automatically updates a scenario verification instance. The scenario verification instance is a dReach (.drh) file which combines the results of the plan execution with the dynamical model of the vehicle and the low-level trajectory tracking controller. The agent definition file contains the dynamical model of the vehicle and the tracking controller is also written using the syntax of dReach, it may be manually edited in order to match mission specific vehicle models. We provide an example of the syntax of the composed scenario verification instance in Fig. 7 .
Together, the constraints of the environment ξ and ego vehicle goal and constraints φ constitute the specification of the mission. The mission is a success if every execution of the system (i.e., every simulation) satisfies the specification. We stress that we are not simulating the scenario. Rather the formal verification approach we use allows us to make assertions about every execution of the system without actually simulating it.
Tool Output
Each scenario verification instance can return either SAFE or δ-UNSAFE. SAFE means that for all possible executions of the system we can not reach an unsafe state. δ-UNSAFE means that there exists an execution of the system which comes within a δ of the unsafe region, and possibly enters it. If the system is δ-UNSAFE the tool will return a counter-example describing a tube around a concrete trajectory for which the intersection with the unsafe region is not empty. 
Building an Autonomous Vehicle Agent
As shown in Fig. 2 , we need to capture the plant dynamics, the low level tracking controller, and the planning stack which generates the trajectories for the vehicle to follow.
Modeling
We illustrate the usage of APEX by using it to verify several scenarios which cause the ego-vehicle to attempt a lane change maneuver. APEX can analyze a wide variety of vehicle models because the underlying framework can perform verification over non-linear hybrid systems. Specifically, transcendental and trigonometric functions are supported. The first step towards verification is a model of the system which must be checked. The formalism which describes the modeling language for APEX is that of hybrid systems (described in the Theory section ). The trajectory tracking controller and plant can be described using ordinary differential equations; however, the discrete nature of the behavioral control layer dictates that we much capture a system with mixed continuous-discrete dynamics. We provide a list of symbols used in Table 1 .
Plant Model
To demonstrate the ability of APEX to investigate more complex vehicle models we provide a non-linear 7 degree of freedom bicycle model in order to describe the ego-vehicle plant. Higher order models can be supported in the future, and of course the parameters of the base model can be customized in order to match specific vehicle models. Fig. 8 depicts the bicycle model abstraction. The input to such a model is steering angle velocity and linear velocity, the output is vehicle state as a function of time.
State Equations
The ego vehicle state consists of various dynamical quantities from the bicycle model [10] of a car. The state vector describing the vehicle is described in equation 1. The variable β is the slip angle at the center of mass, ψ is the heading angle,ψ is the yaw rate, v is the velocity, s x and s y are the x and y positions, and δ is the angle of the front wheel. In the formulation of [6] , the inputs to the system are a x , the longitudinal acceleration, and v w the rotational speed of the steering angle. The y terms represent disturbances to the system. For example y β and yψ represent disturbances to the slip angle at the center of mass 
The state equations for the system as described in [2] are: 
Longitudinal Acceleration
We note that in order to analyze the system we representψ as two first order differential equations. Thus we write:
Finally, one must substitute ψ dot for each appearance ofψ in the other state equations.
Vehicle Parameters
The parameters C f , C r and l f , l r describe respectively the cornering stiffness and distances from the center of gravity to the axles respectively; the subscripts f, r denote whether the parameter is defined for the front or rear of the vehicle. The moment of inertia, I z and the vehicle mass, m are experimentally determined constants [11] . The parameters of the model can be experimentally determined and validated. The kinematic bicycle model considers the two front wheels and two rear wheels of the vehicle to move in unison, with steering provided by the front wheels only. Furthermore, Each abstracted wheel is located along the center of the vehicle's body. Table 2 contains the validated vehicle parameters as given in [2] . The parameters computed for this controller when implemented and validated on a typical crossover SUV [2] are presented in Table 3 . Thus, the feedback to the system are the lateral and longitudinal tracking errors. We derive the following results as in [11] :
Through the lateral tracking error, and desired trajectory we can then compute the desired rate of change of the angle of the front wheel with respect to time. This enables the computation of rate of change of the rotational speed of the steering angle. We note that the relevant parameters are again defined using the validated model and are compiled in Table 3 .
The longitudinal acceleration is simply defined by the tracking error between the actual velocity and the desired velocity.
Combining the equations as in [2] the control inputs for longitudinal acceleration (pressing the accelerator) and steering angle velocity (turning the steering wheel) can be computed as v w Figure 9 : Details of a local planning algorithm and used by AVs employing state lattice planning and a x respectively.
We note that we cannot use traditional linear systems techniques or sum of squares optimizations to find a Lyapunov function for this system because of the obvious non-linearity and non-polynomial form of the governing ordinary differential equations. Instead we will seek to show stability and safety properties using reachability and model checking analysis.
Planning
In APEX we provide a validated planning stack which can be run on a real vehicle. The planning strategy is hierarchical and includes: mission planning, behavioral planning, and local planning. In this section we will focus on the local planner because it is the layer which connects directly to the tracking controller for the vehicle. The local planner is used to generate smooth trajectories which a non-holonomic dynamically constrained vehicle is capable of following. Our planning stack utilizes the methods outlined in [8] commonly known as statelattice planning with cubic spline trajectory generation.
Each execution of the planner requires as an input the current state of the vehicle and a goal state as defined by the behavioral planner. We note that we will call the vehicle state x planner because it does not necessarily have to be the same as the model used for verification (although it can be); because in general the planner must run online, in real-time, lower order models are often substituted here. In this implementation we define x sl as:
Where s x and s y are the x and y positions of the center of mass, v is the velocity, Ψ is the heading angle, and κ is the curvature. We note that the state equations involve an additional constant, L which is the wheelbase of the vehicle. Where the state equations are described as:
The local planner's objective is then to find a feasible trajectory from the initial state defined by the tuple x sl to a goal pose x p defined as:
In this formulation we limit trajectories to a specific class of parameterized curves known as cubic splines. A cubic spline is defined as a function of arc length:
Note that there are four free parameters (a, b, c, s f ) and our goal posture has four states. Thus, a cubic spline is a minimal polynomial that can be assured to produce a trajectory from the current position to the goal position (if it is kinematically feasible). For any particular state, goal pair there are two steps necessary to compute the parameters. First, it is necessary to produce an initial guess. There are several approaches available such as using a neural network, lookup table, or a simple heuristic. In this case we adapt a heuristic from Nagy and Kelly [9] such that it is compatible with a stable parameter formulation presented by McNaughton [8] . The stable reparameterization is defined as:
Where the parameters (a, b, c, s f ) can now be expressed as:
Which results in the following initialization heuristic:
Finally, with an initial guess in hand, and a stable reparameterization the local planner can solve a simple gradient descent problem to drive the vehicle to the goal posture.
Thus, we can now compute a set of parameterized trajectories which may each be evaluated to test for safety and optimality. A description of these aspects of the planner may be Figure 10 : Output of an execution (10 Hz) of the trajectory generator, a single trajectory will be chosen from this set.
found in [8] and such a cost function can obviously be modified based on the goals of the design team. We note that our algorithm implementation is parallelized using OpenMP such that multiple trajectories (with goals regularly sampled around the initial goal) may be evaluated simultaneously. Furthermore, with small changes we can also support quintic splines which expand the variety of possible maneuvers and are more suitable for high speed driving. Figure 10 shows an example of a trajectory generation instance.
Specification
In general formal verification requires both a system model and a specification. This means that the project stakeholders must provide an exact definition of the desirable system properties. Furthermore, it is often the case that such properties are expressed as occurring only under certain conditions. For example, the ego vehicle should drive in the selected lane at the speed limit unless a stop sign is encountered. The traffic laws of a given region provide an excellent, but informal definition of many of the high level specifications which the ego vehicle should adhere to. For convenience we provide the symbols used to describe the vehicle specification in Table 4 
Ego Vehicle Specifcation
The specification for the ego vehicle has two components: safety properties and liveness properties. The general properties are as follows:
• The ego vehicle travels at a velocity less than or equal to the speed limit 2 (v ego ≤ v limit ) (36)
• The ego vehicle does not drive backwards
• The ego vehicle does not collide with any of the n other objects in the environment
• If a timed lane change request is invoked, the ego vehicle completes the lane change on time.
Environment Specification
The other vehicles operating within a scenario present both an interesting challenge and a primary motivation for formal verification. It is clear that it is impossible to know the intentions of the agents operating such vehicles; their execution represents a significant source of non-determinism. In fact, a more complex model of such agents which includes details such as steering angle or tire friction will not enable less conservative results, for it is the control input not the plant that remains the largest unknown. Thus, we conclude that: for verifying the autonomous agent, only the perceptible behavior of other agents is important, not their internal structure.
Still it remains clear that the behavior of other agents must be part of the scenario description. As such we present a safety case which assumes that other agents will follow a certain minimal set of driving rules.
• Acceleration ceases when some maximum velocity is reached.
• Other agents must drive forwards
• The accelerations of other agents are within those rates achievable by maximum engine power
• Other agents maintain their lanes unless explicitly specified not to.
• Lane changes by other agents are only permitted if the alternate lane is unoccupied or unless a degenerate scenario is being modeled.
2 (LO → ¬LC) (43) Figure 11 : An automaton describing a simplistic behavior planner for lane changes
Case Studies
We briefly introduce and expand on the concept of driving scenarios to help reason about inherently diverse situations and requirements which an autonomous vehicle might face.
An unsafe lane change scenario
The following example describes a lane change scenario in the context of a mission and mobility goals. In this description we imply a valid planning solution, but seek to verify that individual trajecotries which are selected in the execution of the plan are safe. First, in Scenario 1 we will demonstrate a dangerous condition that could have been missed under testing or simulation. Next, in Scenario 2 we will show how a refinement in the requirements on the perception system or a refinement in the behavioral controller can lead to a provably safe maneuver. Scenario 1 (A simple lane change and goal) As shown in Fig. 12 , the ego vehicle is driving in the right lane of a uni-directional two lane road network. Another car is driving in front of the ego vehicle at a lower speed. We consider the extreme case where the environmental vehicle stops. The ego vehicle's planner must eventually initiate a lane change maneuver, which involves moving to the left lane, in order to enter a left hand turn lane at a four way stop. We highlight that there is significant uncertainty regarding the ego vehicles orientation and that it may deviate (initially) from the reference trajectory (dashed line) while the tracking controller recovers. We note that the specification of the environment and the ego-vehicle in this scenario are defined as ξ and φ respectively.
Behavioral controller
We associate a behavioral controller B 1 with Scenario 1. Figure  11 details the controller, where LC means "Lane Change" and Figure 12 : A lane change scenario that could have been missed in testing due to nonintuitive and uncountably infinite set of initial conditions. This scenario is unsafe for certain inter-vehicle buffer spacing and reachability analysis determines the minimum spacing to achieve a safe lance change. Table 5 records the parameters. It is a simple finite state deterministic automaton. We note, that this particular behavior controller is almost surely too simplistic to cover all of the scenarios faced by an actual vehicle, nevertheless it illustrates how we may formally represent a set of rules which instantiate certain behavior classes on an autonomous vehicle. Both controllers generated via reinforcement learning and reactive behavior controllers created via synthesis are ideally represented as deterministic finite automatons. As our current goal is to demonstrate that verification is possible, rather than the richness of the scenarios that the behavioral controller can handle, we find this controller suitable.
Given any deterministic finite automaton it is possible to express as a computational logic tree. Such a tree is rooted in a single state, is infinite in size, and represents a branching notion of time; that is each state (moment in time) may split into multiple possible future worlds. As we will explain in the following sections, such a representation is at the heart of the APEX approach and verification occurs over a bounded search depth on such a computation tree.
We present the initialization of the scenario and the results of the verification. Table 6 contains the initialization of each parameter.
Verification and Result
Finally, we define a set R unsaf e which expresses that the system fails if it still hasn't changed lanes within 2 sec or it collides with the car ahead of it.
Then, using APEX we attempt to show that there is no execution of the system which can satisfy this goal. However, because the system is incorrectly designed dReach returns δ-SAT. 
A Safe lane change scenario
Using the information and counterexample from the previous scenario it is easy to see that the behavior controller must be corrected in order to guarantee safety of the lane change scenario. Scenario 2 (A more conservative behavioral controller) We begin with Scenario 1. In order to ensure the forward safety of the vehicle we propose a small modification to the behavioral controller of the vehicle, and furthermore require that the ego vehicle's localization system return estimates with less uncertainty. Namely, we first increase the size of variable buffer, so that the ego vehicle is forced to initiate a lane change maneuver earlier. Secondly, we decrease the size of the initial sets. Speed v now starts anywhere in [10.9, 11] and s y starts in [0.0,0.05].
With these changes, dReal returns UNSAT, meaning that no trajectory of the system violates the constraints.
APEX internals and theory
APEX maintains an internal representation of the scenario as a hybrid system. The components of this hybrid system are:
• The behavioral planners of all vehicles involved, B 1 , . . . , B n . Fig. 11 shows the behavioral planner we used in the case study for a lane change. A behavioral planner is a finite state system. We will refer to each state of a behavioral planner as a mode.
• For every vehicle, the continuous dynamics involved in each of the modes of its behavioral planner. In general, different modes may require different dynamics: e.g. a Collision Avoidance mode which is invoked when a collision is imminent requires more stability control than a turn at a low speed. The continuous dynamics are given in terms of Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs)ẋ i = f i (x i ), where x i ∈ R n is the continuous state of the i th agent.
• For each vehicle, transition conditions between the modes of the behavioral planner B i in terms of the state vector x i . The planner transitions between two modes q and q only if a guard condition G q,q is satisfied. The guard condition is expressed as a set in the state space of the scenario, so that there's a transition between two states q and q only if x ∈ G⊂ R N . For example, there's a LF-to-LC transition only if the two cars are closer than 10m and the following car is faster than the leading car. These conditions are represented as guard sets, which are subsets of the state space. 
Together, these make up a hybrid system, so-called because it combines discrete dynamics in the behavioral planner with continuous dynamics in each mode. We will refer to the n hybrid systems of the n agents in the scenario as H 1 , . . . , H n . The state of the scenario x is simply x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ).
APEX does not keep an internal representation of the motion planner. Rather, as explained in earlier sections, APEX issues calls to the motion planner in the course of the verification, and obtains a trajectory from it.
APEX also needs to maintain a description of the scenario specification. This specification is provided by the user and can be any formula in first-order logic over the set of modes and states of all agents. See Section . For example the following is a possible specification:
The following sections describe how APEX verifies a property of the scenario using this internal representation.
Execution tree and formal model
Let B be a behavioral planner of a given vehicle. The formal model of the behavioral planner is a finite transition system B = (Q, q 0 , Σ, →) where Q is the finite set of modes, q 0 is the initial mode, Σ is a set of output labels, and →⊂ Q × Σ × Q is the labeled transition relation of the system. We write q σ − → q for (q, σ, q ) ∈− →. Fig. 11 shows the behavioral planner that is used by APEX by default for modeling a lane change controller. It can be described as B = ({LC, LF }, LF, R n , {(LF, LF ), (LF, LC), (LC, LF )}). In mode LF, the vehicle's goal is to follow the current lane. In mode LC, the vehicle's goal is to change lanes. In general, a mode represents a decision by the controller, a behavior that the vehicle should follow. With every transition between modes, the behavioral planner outputs a vector x B in R n : this is the destination that the vehicle must reach.
The planner transitions between modes when certain guard conditions are satisfied. We postpone the discussion of the guard conditions to later in this section, when we introduce the continuous states of the system. The behavioral planner advances in discrete time. The discrete time advances, for example, with every update of the vehicle's sensors. Thus B makes a decision on what to do everytime its information about the environment is updated. The planner may decide to maintain the current decision, i.e., stay in the same mode, if that mode has a self-loop. Mode LF has a self-loop in Fig. 11 . Let ∆t > 0 be the update period. Since every scenario is time-limited, and every transition takes fixed non-zero time ∆t, there is a natural limit D on the number of decisions, or transitions, that can be taken in any given scenario.
In the first step of the verification process, APEX builds an execution tree: the root of the tree is the initial mode q 0 , and every branch of the tree represents one possible sequence of decisions, i.e. one possible execution of B. See Fig. 13 for the execution tree of the behavioral planner of Fig. 11 . Since the number of transitions is bounded by D in a given scenario, this tree has a depth at most D.
With the execution tree built, APEX must next verify that the sequence of decisions taken by the behavioral planner Figure 14 : The bounded reachability problem in dReach [7] can be implemented by the low-level controllers. E.g., let (LF, LF, LC) be a sequence of decisions of depth 3. In every occurrence of LF, APEX must check that the vehicle can indeed follow the lane, and in every occurrence of LC, APEX must verify that the vehicle can indeed change lanes. In the next section, we define what it means to 'follow the lane' and 'change lanes' via the motion planner.
Before proceeding, we give the rest of the formal model of the scenario in APEX. In addition to the mode, each vehicle is also described by its continuous state x ∈ R n , which contains states such as position, velocity, pose, yaw rate, steering angle, etc. Thus the state of the vehicle is given by the pair (q, x) ≡ h ∈ Q × R n . At time 0 of the scenario, the initial mode is q 0 and the initial state is x(0) ∈ X 0 ⊂ R n . When the behavioral planner is in mode q, the continuous state evolves according to the mode-specific ODEẋ = f q (x). The ODE is mode-specific since in general, depending on the current behavior of the vehicle, different dynamic forces are applied, or with different parameters. E.g. stability control is activated in more aggressive maneuvers.
The decision to switch modes is made depending on the current state x of the vehicle and the states of the other vehicles in the environment. E.g., if two vehicles are closer than some distance, the trailing vehicle will decide to change lanes. We may re-express this in terms of guard sets: the behavioral planner B 2 of the trailing vehicle will transition LF x B − − → LC if their states x 1 , x 2 are in the set {(x 1 , x 2 ) | ||(s x,1 , s y,1 ) − (s x,2 , s y,2 )|| ≤ ε}. This behavior is more generalized formalized by the guard conditions on the transitions of the behavioral planner. If we let x i denote the state of the i th vehicle in the scenario, i = 1, . . . , m, then we define x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ R nm to be the state of the scenario. Then in the behavioral planner B i , the transition q i σ − → q i is taken when x ∈ G qiq i ⊂ R nm . G qiq i is referred to as a guard set.
When the behavioral planner B i of the i th vehicle is in mode q i , then x is governed byẋ = f q (x) ∈ R n·m , where
We may similarly define a composite initial state for the scenario: q 0 := (q 0,1 , . . . , q 0,m ), and a composite label set Σ = Σ 1 × . . . × Σ m . When B i transitions q i σi − → q i , we consider that the composite system (B 1 , . . . , B m ) transitions q σ − → q where q, q and σ are defined in the natural manner.
The composite system H = (Q, q 0 , Σ, − → H , {f q } q∈Q , {G} (q, * ,q )∈− → ) is a hybrid system: it has discrete transitions in its behavioral planner, and continuous evolutions in its continuous states.
Calling the motion planner
After building the execution tree, APEX starts executing every branch, starting at the root, which is the initial mode q 0 . The initial set of continuous states is X 0 . A transition is taken if the initial set intersects its guard. Since X 0 may intersect more than one guard, then more than one transition are possible. APEX explores all transitions (all branches) in the execution tree. In each mode APEX enters, B will output a destination x B . Formally, x B is a scenario state, but in what remains, it is simpler to think of it as the position that the ego vehicle must reach.
APEX then calls the motion planner to obtain the trajectory that the vehicle will follow. See Fig. 5 . Since the current state is only known as a set X A , APEX sets the starting point of the trajectory to be the center of X A . The motion planner then returns a trajectory starting at x A and ending in a neighborhood of x B . The neighborhood shape and size are known to APEX and are part of the motion planner's description. Let that neighborhood be X B . Note that APEX does not place any restrictions on the motion planner's operation and calls it as a black box. Therefore, the actual motion planner that is used on the real car can be used in the verification of the system. In this way, no effort is needed to abstract the motion planner or model it, and the verification results are directly applicable to the actual deployed software.
Verifying each trajectory
Once a trajectory is generated connecting x A ∈ X A to the neighborhood X B of x B , it remains to verify that the ego vehicle will always reach X B within a specified amount of time T , regardless of where it starts in X A . To verify that the specification is satisfied, APEX builds a reachability problem. This reachability problem is characterized by the following:
• The system: in this case, the system consists of the scenario hybrid system.
• The target set: this is the set that the system should reach. In this case the state of the ego vehicle x 1 should reach X B , and there are no target sets for the other agents.
• The unsafe set: this is the set that the scenario hybrid system must not reach at any point in time. In this case, the ego vehicle must not get closer than d min to any other agent in the scenario.
• A time bound: the target set must be reached within a certain amount of time T .
We call the above a bounded reachability problem -see Fig. 14. To solve this problem, APEX passes it to dReach, a reachability analysis tool for nonlinear hybrid systems. dReach answers the question: is there a trajectory of the vehicle starting in X A that will violate the constraints? (e.g. will not reach the target set X B or will get too close to another vehicle). dReach returns one of two answers. If the answer dReach returns is UN-SAT, then it is guaranteed that no behavior of the ego vehicle will violate the constraints. It should be stressed that this is a mathematical guarantee: no amount of simulation in this case will reveal a violation, because dReach guarantees that no such violation exists. If dReach answers δ-SAT, then this means that there exists a behavior of the ego vehicle which, when perturbed by an amount δ > 0, violates the constraints. See Fig. 4 . The parameter δ can be set by the user. It suffices to choose δ small enough so δ-SAT means the system is not robust since a small perturbation of size δ could cause it to violate the constraints.
Specification language
Because dReach is the verification engine of APEX, and dReach supports first order logic on the reals, APEX supports that same logic for expressing specifications on the hybrid states (q, x). First order logic allows the use of the usual Boolean logical operations (conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, and negation ¬), and quantification on the variables (∃ and ∀). Because time t is a variable, this allows us to express MITL-like properties (MITL is a logic for expressing bounded-time temporal properties).
Conclusion
APEX is a tool for formally verifying the trajectory planning and tracking stacks of ADAS/AV cars, and is available for download. It can perform formal verification on realistic autonomous vehicle planning stacks. Future work will incorporate more complex behavioral controllers for other scenarios, including synthesized planners, and will add a GUI to the tool.
